What is the difference between ethical monism and ethical pluralism

The first problem that this raises for the pluralist is the problem of consistency. How can one consistently accept a principle as valid and at the same time hold that it admits of exceptions?

The answer clearly is that one cannot. If a principle, whether theoretical or practical, admits of exceptions or counter-examples, the only rational option is to modify it or to abandon it.

A pluralist might try to escape this difficulty by arguing that everyday moral principles admit of exceptions because they are only partially formulated. When the principle is fully formulated it incorporates the exceptions and as a consequence the problem of consistency disappears. But this move does not work, since the reformulated version of the principle will inevitably admit of further exceptions. There are almost certainly circumstances other than the three just mentioned where one would be morally justified in killing someone.

The July plot to assassinate Hitler is one example. And no matter how many exceptions one wrote into the principle, there could be no guarantee that there were not other circumstances that had been overlooked. Besides the exceptions that are written into the principle will themselves almost certainly admit of a sub-class of further exceptions. Thus no matter how meticulously one describes the circumstances in which killing in self-defence is morally justifiable, there is no guarantee that one has covered all the eventualities.

But in any event this whole exercise is self-stultifying in the context of pluralism, since the more complicated one makes the principle in an effort to avoid any further exceptions, the more far fetched becomes the claim that the principle is self-evident.

The fact that moral principles admit of exceptions also creates a second problem for pluralism. For how is one to reconcile this fact with the claim that the basic principles of morals are self-evident? Anything that is self-evidently true is true a priori. But anything that admits of exceptions is falsified a posteriori. The notion of a self-evident truth that admits, or is capable of admitting, of exceptions is therefore incoherent.

The fourth and final objection to pluralism is that if there are a plurality of basic moral principles, then there is always the possibility that in certain situations two or more of these principles may come into conflict. How is this conflict to be resolved?

A monist can resolve it by appealing to the supreme principle of morals, but this move is not possible for a pluralist. The only apparent alternative is to arrange the basic moral principles in order of precedence. The first principle would then override any principle with which it comes in conflict; the second principle would override every principle but the first and so on.

But this would give very counter-intuitive results, for it is generally accepted that when moral principles come into conflict, principle A will override principle B in one situation, but will be overridden by principle B in another. Well, that summarizes the case for the persecution and it looks like a pretty impressive case.

I shall present this case by examining each of the four objections to pluralism in the reverse order from which I presented them. What can the pluralist say in reply to the charge that pluralism is unable to provide a test for resolving conflicts of moral principles?

Thus if one is a utilitarian it will be sometimes be simply a matter of judgement as to which of two alternative actions is conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It is simply part of what is involved in being a moral agent. The second and third objections to pluralism both derive from the apparent fact that moral principles admit of exceptions.

The only way to defend pluralism against these objections is to deny that this is a genuine fact, for if moral principles do admit of exceptions, one cannot regard them as self-validating, nor can one consistently regard them as valid moral principles. But it would seem impossible to deny that moral principles admit of exceptions, since to do so is to embrace a completely implausible form of moral rigourism.

However, there is one other way of getting rid of exceptions to moral principles and that is by distinguishing between two different senses of moral obligation.

One can have a moral obligation to do something without it being the case that one has a moral obligation to do it all things considered. For example, I had a moral obligation to come here this evening and read this paper, since I had promised to do so. But suppose that on my way here I had knocked down a pedestrian and seriously injured him and I was the only person available to bring him to hospital. In that case my obligation to come here and read this paper would have been overridden by my obligation to assist the seriously injured pedestrian.

So all things considered my obligation would be to drive the pedestrian to hospital even though this meant missing my appointment here. The obligation to come here and read a paper is not of course cancelled or nullified by being overridden by the second obligation, since otherwise I would not have found myself subject to a conflict of obligations.

It still exists and it would be changed back into an obligation all things considered if, for example, I encountered an ambulance which relieved me of the duty of bringing the injured person to hospital. A moral obligation that is not, or at least not necessarily, an obligation all things considered I shall call a simple obligation.

This sort of obligation is derived from one morally relevant feature of the action or situation. The other sort of obligation — an obligation all things considered — is derived from all the morally relevant features of the action or situation. And when understood in this way, they almost inevitably admit of exceptions.

Likewise if the principle that one ought not tell lies is understood to mean that there is a moral obligation all things considered not to tell lies, it too will admit of exceptions, since in some situations the obligation not to tell a lie will be overridden by another obligation.

And since, as we have seen already, one cannot consistently affirm a principle and at the same time concede that it admits of exceptions, this interpretation of moral principles is unacceptable whether one is a pluralist or not. But if one understands moral principles as referring to simple obligations, then they do not admit of exceptions — provided of course that they are valid principles in the first place.

But even when they are overridden, these obligations still exist, so that these situations do not constitute genuine exceptions to the relevant moral principle. Why are moral principles usually understood to refer to obligations all things considered? I think the answer is that moral principles only rarely admit of exceptions. Most people, I suspect, never find themselves in situations where they would be justified in stealing or killing or injuring other people and only rarely find themselves in situations where they are justified in lying or breaking promises.

Now if a simple obligations turns out in most situations to be an obligation all things considered, then it is easy to understood how a principle about simple obligations would be construed as a principle about obligations all things considered. If I am right in arguing that moral principles are concerned with simple obligations and consequently do not admit of exceptions, then the second and third objections to ethical pluralism collapse. There remains the first objection, which is that ethical pluralists have failed to provide an acceptable account of how we recognize the basic principles of morality as valid.

I believe that, as things stand, this objection is correct. It is very difficult to make any sense of the notion of a special moral sense and in any event to invoke such a sense is to multiply entities without necessity. But Callicott argues that individuals cannot play 'metaphysical musical chairs': we cannot be utilitarians one minute, and then slip into Kantianism the next.

We cannot live with constant self-contradiction. Furthermore, Callicott believes that pluralism can allow unscrupulous or weak moral agents to choose principles that favour their own advantage.

You may have reached the conclusion that, in order to be consistent, an individual cannot play 'metaphysical musical chairs' and select different ethical frameworks to justify different moral decisions as they please. You may agree with Callicott that an individual needs one coherent moral framework that is not contradictory. Or, alternatively, you may think that it is acceptable for different ethical theories to be used for different relationships or in different areas of life.

Whatever your answer, these questions relate to intrapersonal pluralism - the theory that one individual person can rationally follow more than one ethical theory.

Here, in contrast, we consider a slightly different question. Even if we say that a person should follow only one, unified ethical theory, does this mean that everyone in the world should follow this theory? In other words, is there only one, morally correct theory to follow, or can we consistently argue that what is right for me does not necessarily have to be right for everyone, everywhere in the world? If you believe that we can argue the latter, then you are an interpersonal pluralist. Having studied the unit so far, is there an ethical framework that you would like to adopt as an alternative to the framework s that you identified in your answer above?

However, before we accept pluralism as a useful compromise, we should think very carefully about the consequences. What would happen if different people followed different ethical frameworks within a society?

Could some people potentially lose out? For example, if one person follows a deep ecology ethic, but their neighbour follows an anthropocentric utilitarian ethic, there is likely to be conflict between them. How do we deal with these conflicts? How do we decide who is right or wrong? Whatever the answers to these questions may be, pluralists point out that interpersonal pluralism is what, in fact, we encounter particularly in today's multicultural societies.

Then again, why is it that people coming from different societies should have different ideas about the environment and should use different ethical frameworks?

Taking a pluralist approach clearly has its difficulties. However, when we look at development and environmental policies, it will often be the case that there is not one clearly 'correct' decision to take and numerous incorrect ones. Moreover, each decision will probably result in an outcome where some people gain and some people suffer.

Not all of these options will be equally good or bad. Examining the ethical issues behind each option can help us to make clearer decisions - and can hopefully ensure that we choose one of the better options. Your browser does not support Javascript. You should still be able to navigate through these materials but selftest questions will not work.

Spring , pp. Marsella, Anthony J. Culture and conflict: Understanding, negotiating, and reconciling conflicting constructions of reality. McDonald, Michael. Cross-Cultural Ethics and International Development. Relevance to ISL: Sustainability Ethical pluralism suggests your actions may be in opposition to local norms, or you might be expected to act in opposition to your own norms.

Cultural Competence Understanding your own cultural and ethical norms in addition to those of others is essential to cultural competence. Balance and Reciprocity Those involved in international work must understand and respect other ethical norms. But perhaps this sets the wrong kind of goal for ethical theory. The idea that there might be a single universal and absolute criterion of morally right action strikes many who value cultural diversity as highly problematic.

But lest we abandon monist approaches to ethical theory too quickly, we should note that the standards of right action offered by both the utilitarian and the Kantian are highly abstract and for this reason they are quite compatible with a rich range of diversity in more specific derivative guidelines for action.

In fact, lots of cultural diversity can be explained in terms of more broadly shared underlying moral values. Eating the dead may be seen as a way of honoring them in one culture, but be considered a sacrilege in another culture.

Both of these diverse practices can be seen as diverse ways of expressing respect for persons. The difference between cultures in this case is not really a difference of fundamental moral values, but a difference in how these are to be expressed. Similarly we consider infanticide morally wrong while other cultures facing more difficult environmental pressures may practice it routinely. What may seem like conflicting moral standards at this more specific derivative level might instead be understood as differing ways of maximizing happiness that are appropriate for the starkly different circumstances that the respective cultures must deal with.

So absolutist, universalizing, monist ethical theories turn out to be considerably more accommodating of cultural diversity than we might have thought at first. Still, they may not be flexible enough. It might be that some cultures value respect for persons over happiness while others value happiness at the expense of respect for persons and others yet value community or kinship relations more than happiness or respect for individual persons.

That is, we might find conflicts in the most basic or fundamental moral values upheld by diverse cultures. How can ethical theory account for this without begging questions against one set of cultural values or another? Recall that the ethical monist is out to discover a single rationally defensible moral truth that is grounded in a single kind of moral value.

This is because these theories offer logically incompatible principles of morally right action. There is nothing logically incoherent about taking happiness and respect for persons to both be good in fundamental ways. And there may be other plausible candidates for fundamental goodness. Happiness and respect were just the ones that got most of the attention in the 18th and 19th century. Since then, feminist philosophers have argued that we should recognize a fundamental kind of value in caring relationships.

Environmental ethicists have argued that we should recognize a fundamental kind of value in the natural world. Hindus and Buddhists have long suggested that there is a kind of fundamental value in consciousness. Perhaps this short list is long enough. Or perhaps it is already too long. So if caring relationships matter just because they bring happiness to human lives, then we already have this kind of value covered when we recognize happiness as a kind of fundamental value.

But it is not at all clear that happiness fully explains the value of caring relationships. There are issues to explore here and feminist philosophers are just starting to map out this terrain.

In any case, kinds of fundamental value might be rare, but still plural. So what should ethical theory say about cultures that differ in the fundamental values that shape their customs and codes?